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tions purported to resolve the entire question of compensatory
damages despite the fact that neither stated specific items of
damages. The compensations given were held to have already
included a consideration of prejudgment interest.
Wyandotte clarified two important matters. First, it em-
phasized that the granting of prejudgment interest was not
solely based on the question of whether the amount of damages
was determinable. The court stressed that the granting of pre-
judgment interest was determined by a balancing of the injured
party's right to be fully compensated against the right of the
withholding party to be free from a claim for prejudgment in-
terest when his refusal to pay the claia was legally justified.
Second, Wyandotte made clear that a stipulation wh ich pur-
ports to resolve the entire damage question will preclude a
claim for prejudgment interest unless the stipulation makes
clear that such a claim is expressly reserved.
JoHN L. SCHLIESMANN
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
I. CONSTRUcTIVE TRUSTS
Ordinarily the breach of an oral promise to devise realty by
will is not grounds for imposing a constructive trust against a
promisor or his successor.' Such a decree would generally con-
stitute a violation of Wisconsin Statute section 853.06 which
requires a written instrument, signed by the testator and exe-
cuted in the presence of witnesses, to effectuate a transfer of a
decedent's property. 2 However, when the breach by a promisor
of an oral promise to devise results in unjust enrichment of the
actual devisee, the court may exercise its equitable authority
to impose a constructive trust in favor of the promisee. Utiliz-
ing this doctrine in Meyer v. Ludwig,3 the court unanimously
affirmed a trial court order imposing a constructive trust in
favor of the defendant-daughter on land willed to the plaintiff
by his deceased wife. The land had been orally promised to the
defendant over twenty years prior to this action. In reliance on
this promise, the defendant and her husband had significantly
1. BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 83, 85 (5th ed. 1973).
2. Wis. STAT. § 853.03 (1973).
3. 65 Wis. 2d 280, 222 N.W.2d 679 (1974).
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improved the property.' The mother's will, however, was never
amended to reflect this promise to convey. When the will was
probated, the plaintiff received the promised parcel of land by
devise.
Plaintiff-father contested the trial court's imposition of a
constructive trust on the devised land asserting that his wife's
promise was not binding on him. Furthermore, it was urged
that the trial court's action constituted a belated amendment
of the decedent's will, recognizably an action beyond judicial
authority. If neither argument sufficed, the plaintiff alleged
that the statute of limitations effectively barred this action
commenced seven years after the decedent's death. All of these
arguments failed.
In Wisconsin, constructive trusts have traditionally been
recognized as: " '. . . a device in a court of equity to prevent
unjust enrichment which arises from fraud or abuse of confi-
dential relationship and is implied to accomplish justice.' "" By
judicial interpretation, this rule has been held to extend be-
yond the Restatement Rule,' casually referred to as an "unjust
enrichment only" test, by requiring an additional element of
proof: " '. . . duress, abuse of confidence, mistake, commission
of a wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, [against
one who] has either obtained or holds the legal title to property
which he ought not in equity and in good conscience benefi-
cially enjoy.' ",7
The court relied on evidence of defendant's substantial in-
vestments and justifiable reliance on the decedent's assertions
as sufficient proof of the first requirement for imposing a con-
structive trust - unjust enrichment. The court found the sec-
ond element fulfilled, reasoning that a confidential relationship
4. Id. at 282, 222 N.W.2d 680. The court reported evidence that defendant and her
husband had made considerable improvements to the property between 1945 and 1968,
including the installation of running water, electricity, new floors, insulation, kitchen
facilities, garage, driveway, bathroom, front porch, new roof and landscaping.
5. 65 Wis. 2d at 285, 222 N.W.2d at 682, quoting Estate of Massouras, 16 Wis. 2d
304, 312, 114 N.W.2d 449, 453 (1962); see also Masino v. Sechrest, 268 Wis. 101, 66
N.W.2d 740 (1954); Nehls v. Meyer, 7 Wis. 2d 37, 95 N.W.2d 780 (1959); Estate of
Schmalz, 58 Wis. 2d 220, 206 N.W.2d 141 (1973).
6. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937):
Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to
convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises.
7. 65 Wis. 2d at 286, 222 N.W.2d at 682, quoting Estate of Massouras, 16 Wis. 2d
304, 312, 114 N.W.2d 449, 453 (1962).
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between the defendant and plaintiff arose from their filial rela-
tionship and proven mutual assistance and inter-family coop-
eration.
The plaintiff-father unsuccessfully contested any abuse of
a confidential relationship insisting that since he had not made
the promise to convey he had no duty to fulfill it. The court
acknowledged the fact that actual abuse of a confidential rela-
tionship occurred when the mother failed to will or convey the
land to her daughter. However, the court pointed out that the
plaintiff, as father, "stood in the same confidential relationship
to their daughter as did his deceased wife," 8 having knowledge
of the promise and benefiting from subsequent inter-family
cooperation. The decedent's "abuse of a confidential relation-
ship" was thus imputed to the plaintiff-father and constituted
the final element to justify imposition of the constructive trust.
The court added that even if the plaintiff had been "a
stranger to the promise made, the relationship existing, and
the benefits derived," 9 his status as transferee rather than
promisor would not prevent imposition of a constructive trust.
The court quoted with approval the rule that "'[w]here a
person holding property transfers it to another in violation of
his duty to a third person, the third person can reach the prop-
erty in the hands of the transferee [by means of a constructive
trust] unless the transferee is a bona fide purchaser.' "10
The court's indulgence in this dicta was purportedly to
"nail shut" the "escape hatch" which the plaintiff-father had
attempted to utilize to preclude his liability under the testa-
trix's promise. The court's attempt, however, appears less than
conclusive and the court's propensity to impose constructive
trusts, less than settled. An innocent donee, ignorant of a prior
promise or breach, who has neither been associated with nor
benefited from the relationship in issue, is arguably the ulti-
mate "stranger" to an alleged inequitable transfer. As pre-
viously noted, however, constructive trusts are imposed to
reach transfers deemed secured by a recipient's unconscionable
conduct." A transfer to an innocent donee would thus seem-
ingly not warrant utilization of this equitable remedy by the
8. 65 Wis. 2d at 289, 222 N.W.2d at 683.
9. Id.
10. Id. quoting Richards v. Richards, 58 Wis. 2d 290, 206 N.W.2d 134, 138 (1973)
which cited and adopted the rule as stated in 5 Scorr, TRUSTS § 470 (3d ed. 1967).
11. See generally BOGERT, TRUSTS, §§ 83-85 (5th ed. 1973).
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court. Imposition of a constructive trust in such a circumstance
would, however, be within the scope of the Wisconsin court's
dicta.
The court also' rejected the plaintiff-father's second argu-
ment that the imposition of the constructive trust constituted
a belated amendment of the final probate judgment of the
decedent's will and noted that the plaintiff had misconceived
the legal rights involved in the imposition of a constructive
trust on property. The court clarified the distinction:
The heirs or legatees do not receive, under a final judgment
in the probate of an estate, any more title than the testator
had to give. If, in an appropriate subsequent proceeding,
there is an impressing of a constructive trust upon the inter-
est of the testator in a piece of property, the constructive trust
follows the property to the legatee or heir who receives title
from the testator. The challenge is not to the fact of transfer
but to what is in fact transferred under the will."
Defendant-daughter's title thus arose from the constructive
trust created, not from a change in the probate judgment.
The statute of limitations argument was also rejected by the
court. The plaintiff-father had argued that the applicable sta-
tutory provisions were either of two six year statutes of limita-
tions, one dealing with claims against a decedent or his estate, 3
the other pertaining to fraud actions.'" Citing prior authority,'"
the court noted that since no fraud was asserted, the ten year
limitation period under Wisconsin Statute section 893.18(4)
was applicable. No cause of action occurred until the mother
actually died leaving a will which did not fulfill her promise to
convey the land. Since only seven years had lapsed since that
time, the ten year statutory period presented no bar to the
defendant's action. Thus, every argument of the defendant was
rejected.
I. WISCONSIN UNIFORM GIFrS TO MINORS ACT
The scope of a custodian's authority under the Wisconsin
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act'" was defined with greater speci-
12. 65 Wis. 2d at 292, 222 N.W.2d at 685.
13. Wis. STAT. § 893.19(9) (1973).
14. WiS. STAT. § 893.19(7) (1973).
15. Estate of Demos, 50 Wis. 2d 262, 184 N.W.2d 117 (1971).
16. Wis. STAT. § 880.61 et seq. (1973).
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ficity during this term of court in Erdman v. Erdman.7 Pur-
suant to a decree of divorce, the defendant-father had been
appointed custodian under the Wisconsin Act of an investment
fund gifted to his children by their grandfather. During the
period of custodianship, the defendant had withdrawn more
than $10,000 from the fund to meet various medical and educa-
tional expenses of his children. Testimony indicted that the
defendant had been unemployed when the expenses arose and
was unable to make the payments from his own resources. No
limitation existed on use of the funds except the grandfather's
request that all withdrawals be expended for the minors' bene-
fit. The divorce decree, however, had obligated the defendant
to pay all medical and educational expenses of his children.
When the children reached majority the balance of the fund
was transferred to them. This action was subsequently com-
menced by the plaintiff-mother for return of the amount with-
drawn from the investment fund by the defendant.
On appeal the trial court decision was affirmed; the defen-
dant had exceeded the scope of his custodial authority under
Wisconsin Statute section 880.64(2)5 by using proceeds to de-
fray his own support obligation. The court relied heavily on a
prior United States Tax Court decision,19 which in pertinent
part asserted:
[A] custodian named thereunder [Wisconsin Uniform Gift
to Minors Act] has both the power to apply income or princi-
pal for the minor's support, maintenance, education, or bene-
17. 67 Wis. 2d 116, 226 N.W.2d 439 (1975).
18. Wis. STAT. § 880.64(2) (1973) reads:
Duties and powers of custodian
(2) The custodian shall pay over to the minor for expenditure by him, or expend
for the minor's benefit, so much of or all the custodial property as the custodian
deems advisable for the support, maintenance, education and benefit of the
minor in the manner, at the time or times, and to the extent that the custodian
in his discretion deems suitable and proper with or without court order, with or
without regard to the duty of himself or of any other person to support the minor
or his ability to do so, and with or without regard to any other income or property
of the minor which may be applicable or available for any such purpose.
19. Estate of Prudowsky v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 890 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 465
F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1972). In Prudowsky, the decedent had held certain assets as cus-
todian for his children under Wisconsin's Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. All of the assets
had been donated by the decedent. Prudowsky's executor attempted to prevent estate
taxation of these amounts by arguing that the assets could not be considered part of
the decedent's property since Prudowsky would have been restrained from employing
them in satisfaction of any legal support obligation. The tax court rejected this argu-
ment and included the assets in the estate.
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fit, and the power to terminate the relationship at his discre-
tion. The former power permits a parent who names himself
as custodian of a gift to his minor child to apply the funds of
that custodianship in satisfaction of his legal obligation of
support; the latter creates a power of termination."
The act of creating the gift and the accompanying potential to
terminate the benefit were found to be essential contigencies
on the power to expend custodial funds in lieu of a pre-existing
support obligation. Reflecting on the tax court decision, the
Wisconsin court asserted with approval that only a transferor-
custodian could, at his discretion, return the gifted assets to his
full ownership and redirect them to fulfill an independent obli-
gation.2' In Erdman, however, the defendant had not created
the fund by transferring property to himself as custodian. The
investment fund had been created by a court of equity which
alone retained the right to terminate or modify the gift's exist-
ence. Absent the act of creation and the right of termination,
the defendant-custodian had no authority to satisfy his per-
sonal responsibilities with fund money. 2
The significance placed by the Wisconsin court on the act
of creation and right of termination is difficult to reconcile with
the apparent applicability and significance of Wisconsin Stat-
ute section 880.63(1) which defines the interest conferred in a
minor under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. Such an interest
or gift is: "irrevocable and conveys to the minor indefeasibly
vested legal title to the security . . . [and] no guardian of the
minor has any right, power, duty or authority with respect to
the custodial property except as provided in ss. 880.61 to 880.71
[Uniform Gifts to Minors Act]." 3 While the custodian is au-
thorized to expend "so much of or all"2 the custodial property
as is deemed advisable, the disposition must, in every case, be
to or for the benefit of the minor. There is no authorization for
20. Id. at 892.
21. 67 Wis. 2d at 121, 226 N.W.2d at 442:
[Tihis power to terminate the fund for the benefit of children and return the
assets involved to full control and ownership of the parent who created the fund
was crucial .... In the case before us we do not have one who had a legal
obligation to support children transferring property to himself as custodian, and
retaining the right to terminate ... on the part of the person named as cus-
todian of the fund.
22. Id; see also Schwartz Estate, 449 Pa. 112, 115 n. 2, 295 A.2d 600, 603 n. 2 (1972).
23. Wis. STAT. § 880.63(1) (1973).
24. Wis. STAT. § 880.64(2) (1973).
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a donor-custodian to recapture gifted assets to his own full
ownership and control. Indeed, any such provision would be
contrary to the status of an indefeasibly vested right in one
other than the donor-custodian. Additional elucidation by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court on the applicability of section 880.63
would be useful.
The court stressed that as a court-appointed custodian, the
defendant also assumed the role and responsibility of a trustee.
This implicitly obligated the defendant to "treat the fund as
belonging to the children and to expend it only for the benefit
of the children, not for the benefit of the trustee."25 The court
acknowledged that the withdrawn funds had been used exclu-
sively to meet the children's expenses. It asserted, however,
that the true benefit improperly accrued to the custodian
through his utilization of the funds to solve his own financial
problems. 6
The use of gifted funds by a non-transferor parent-
custodian to fulfill his legal obligation to support the
beneficiary-children was not summarily precluded by Erdman.
The court, however, noted that the legal obligation could be
circumvented only if the parent had: (1) applied to the ap-
pointing court, (2) established the fact of his inability as a
parent to support his children, and (3) established the need of
or benefit to the children in using the fund. 7 The crucial lan-
guage of Wisconsin Statute section 880.64(2), "[tjhe cus-
todian shall . . . expend for the minor's benefit . . . with or
without court order, with or without regard to the duty of him-
self or any other person to support the minor or his ability to
do so . . . ,"8 was thus limited, making it impossible for a
custodian to use his statutory authority to his own advantage.
IL. CLAIMS-STATUTORY COMPLIANCE
The necessity of strict compliance with statutory proce-
dures for submitting claims against a decedent's estate was
underscored by the court in the Estate of Palmer.29 In this case
plaintiff-creditor sought reversal of a county court order bar-
ring recovery on loans made to the decedent but not claimed
25. 67 Wis. 2d at 122, 226 N.W.2d at 442.
26. Id. at 124, 226 N.W.2d at 443.
27. Id.
28. Wis. STAT. § 880.64(2) (1973).
29. 68 Wis. 2d 101, 227 N.W.2d 680 (1975).
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against the estate. Following the decedent's death, over three
years before this action, the plaintiff had accepted a guaranty
from the estate's executor promising payment of all outstand-
ing and future loans to the decedent's business enterprises. In
exchange for this assurance, the plaintiff agreed not to submit
a claim against the estate within the statutory period for such
filing. After several Palmer corporations defaulted on their
loans, the plaintiff petitioned the county court for recovery
against the estate under the guaranty.
On appeal the supreme court affirmed the trial court's de-
termination that the guaranty was unenforceable. The court
stated that the guaranteed debts constituted contingent
claims, enforceable only if properly filed against the estate
within the statutory period required. Not only was the filing-
of-claims requirement a statutory provision, but it had re-
ceived recognition under Wisconsin case law as a nonwaiver-
able rule °.3 The court insisted that the execution of the guar-
anty was thus an unsuccessful attempt to elude statutory filing
requirements.
The plaintiff attempted to circumvent this authority by
asserting that the guaranty fell within the statutory exception
to filing claims provided by Wisconsin Statute section 317.10.3
This statute permitted an executor's good faith payment of
unfiled claims to be recognized as a valid satisfaction if paid
within the statutory period for filing claims against the estate.
The plaintiff thus argued that the guaranty constituted pay-
ment of the outstanding claims it represented; actual receipt
of money was a mere technicality enforceable because the guar-
anty had been executed within the requisite filing period.
The court, however, refused to accept this argument. The
real effect of executing the guaranty, it noted, was the creation
of a new obligation for the estate to pay an otherwise unenforce-
able claim. Although the executor had been authorized in the
30. Estate of Lathers, 215 Wis. 151, 251 N.W. 466, 254 N.W. 550 (1934).
31. Wis. STAT. § 317.10 (1967) reads as follows:
Payment of unfiled claims. Where an executor or administrator has, in good
faith, paid claims against the estate without the claims having been filed, such
payments may be allowed under proof that they were just demands against the
estate and were paid within the time limited for the presentation of claims.
Notice that application will be made for such allowance shall be served as
provided in section 324.18. Payment shall be allowed on a pro rata basis with
other claims when the estate is insolvent.
This statute has been amended and renumbered Wis. Stat. § 859.47 (1973).
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decedent's will to settle, extend, or compromise demands and
obligations asserted against the estate, the court held that this
authorization did not extend to creating new liabilities. No
transaction beyond the executor's authority would be recog-
nized.32
The court also refused to bind the decedent's estate to only
those claims existing at his death by severing language in the
guaranty applying to future loans. The court acknowledged as
a primary purpose of the guaranty the executor's professed
desire to insure future corporate advances and creditor good
will. The Wisconsin rule of severability permits deletion of that
part of an otherwise legal transaction "which will not defeat the
primary purpose of the bargain."33 To sever the instrument as
to protect only loans existing at the time of the decedent's
death, the court asserted, would have defeated the primary
purpose of the guaranty.
The supreme court utilized statutes existing at the time of
Palmer's death in 1967 to evaluate the plaintiff-creditor's
claim. In 1971 a new probate code became operative in Wiscon-
sin, changing several of the statutes evaluated in Palmer. Wis-
consin Statute section 859.01 has replaced section 318.08 in
barring all claims not filed against a decedent's estate within
the time required. Exactly what claims must be filed has been
clarified from the previous designation of "every claim against
a decedent, proper to be filed in probate proceedings" to "all
claims against a decedent's estate . . . whether due or to be-
come due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliqui-
dated. '34 Furthermore, the statute eliminates any possibility of
asserting an action against either the personal representative
or the decedent's heirs and beneficiaries to recover on claims
not filed within the three month statute of limitations.
Unlike its 1969 counterpart, Wisconsin Statute section
32. 68 Wis. 2d at 111, 227 N.W.2d at 686.
33. Id. at 112, 227 N.W.2d at 686, quoting Simenstad v. Hagen, 22 Wis. 2d 653,
661, 126 N.W.2d 529, 534 (1964).
34. Wis. STAT. § 859.01(1) (1973) which reads:
Limitation on filing claims against decedent's estates (1) Except as provided
in sub. (3) and s. 859.03, all claims against a decedent's estate including claims
of the state and any subdivision thereof, whether due or to become due, absolute
or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, are forever barred against the estate,
the personal representative and the heirs and beneficiaries of the decedent un-
less filed with the court within the time for filing claims.
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859.21 defines contingent claims and the necessity of filing
such claims is reasserted:
If the amount or validity of a claim cannot be determined
until some time in the future, the claim is a contingent claim
regardless of whether the claim is based on an event which
occurred in the past or on an event which may occur in the
future. . . . [Clontingent claims which cannot be allowed
as absolute must, nevertheless, be filed in the court and
proved in the same manner as absolute claims2
The outstanding and potential debts covered by the executor's
guaranty in Palmer would have been clearly covered by this
language.
Section 859.47, covering payment of unfiled claims, is sub-
stantively identical to its predecessor section 317.10. Creditors
citing this statute to suggest that an executed guaranty consti-
tutes payment of a debt enforceable without filing against the
decedent's estate should expect that their claim will be denied
under the Palmer decision.
Thus the court's conclusion in Palmer would not differ if
current Wisconsin law were applied to an identical fact situa-
tion. The added clarity of the current probate law, however,
might have prevented the plaintiff-creditor from ever accepting
a guaranty in lieu of filing his claim against the decedent's
estate.
It should be noted that Wisconsin's new procedure for infor-
mal administration of a decedent's estate has not minimized
the necessity of proper and timely presentation of creditor's
claims." Although Wisconsin Statute section 865.13 recognized
payment by a personal representative of valid claims against
the estate, whether filed or not, 7 section 865.135 protects only
those claims filed with the probate registrar or court. 8 This
35. Wis. STAT. § 859.21 (1973).
36. Wis. STAT. § 865.01 et seq. (1973). See generally, Comment, Informal Adminis-
tration of Decedent's Estates in Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 581.
37. WIs. STAT. § 865.13 (1973) reads in part:
A personal representative may pay valid demands against the estate, whether
filed as a claim or not, within the time allowed for filing claims.
38. Wis. STAT. § 865.135 (1973) in pertinent part reads:
(1) The claimant may deliver or mail to the probate registrar a written state-
ment of the claim indicating its basis, . ..
(2) The claimant may commence a proceeding against the personal representa-
tive in the court designated by s. 865.01 to obtain payment of his claim against
the estate.
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latter requirement is arguably beneficial to the new probate
system. Proof of a creditor's compliance with the nonclaim
statute can easily be detected if a claim has been processed and
filed at a county courthouse. However, a creditor merely rely-
ing on a personal representative's assurances that payment will
be made may later find his unpaid claim barred for failure to
file. Whether a decedent's estate is administered by formal or
informal procedures, careful compliance with statutory provi-
sions is critical to safeguarding a creditor's claims.
IV. WILL - UNDUE INFLUENCE
Whether a testator's will is the product of undue influence
primarily involves the resolution of issues of fact rather than
law. In one respect the four-three decision in Estate of Hamm 39
was little more than a dispute over the appropriate theory of
law against which the facts would be applied. The sheer weight
of majority rule produced the affirmance of the trial court's
conclusion; the great weight and clear preponderance of the
evidence failed to demonstrate either undue influence or suspi-
cious circumstances surrounding the preparation of the testa-
tor's will. However, a more subtle and perplexing consideration
lingers unresolved in the court's thirty-two page response:
What will the Wisconsin Supreme Court consider sufficiently
clear or suspicious evidence of undue influence in the prepara-
tion of a will?
In Estate of Hamm the testator's heirs challenged, on
grounds of undue influence, the devolution of ninety percent of
an approximately million dollar estate to the decedent's male
nurse and the attendant's brother. The testator had been par-
tially paralyzed for many years and required constant physical
assistance. In 1965, eight years prior to the decedent's death,
the attendant was hired as the testator's companion. Shortly
thereafter, the testator added a codicil to his will bequeathing
$5,000 to the attendant. One week later this devise was in-
creased to five percent of the testator's estate. In 1966 the testa-
tor directed his attorney to prepare a new will. A $35,000 trust
and a $50,000 bequest were willed to the testator's sisters along
with a forty-nine percent interest in the estate residue. The
nurse was also named as a residuary legatee of forty-nine per-
cent of the estate and his brother was to receive the remaining
39. 67 Wis. 2d 279, 227 N.W.2d 34 (1975).
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two percent. The attendant's bequest, however, was condi-
tional upon his remaining in the testator's employ. In the event
of a voluntary termination or discharge for misconduct, the will
provided that the lapsed legacy would devolve to the testator's
sisters. In 1970 the last will, which is the subject of this appeal,
was executed. Under this revision the nurse's share was in-
creased to eighty-five percent and his brother's share to five
percent of the testator's residuary estate. No change was made
in the employment stipulation. However, the nurse's family
was substituted for the testator's sisters as legatees in case the
attendant's share lapsed. In addition, the attendant and his
brother were to receive the specific bequests to the testator's
sisters in the event they predeceased him. The decedent's heirs
asserted that the facts surrounding this sequence of wills, the
escalation of the nurse's distributive share and the substitution
of the attendant's heirs as residuary legatees sufficiently evi-
denced undue influence upon the testator so as to prohibit the
probate of his will.
The primary issue dividing the court was whether the chal-
lengers had met their burden of proof in establishing that the
will had been the product of undue influence. In general, the
burden of proving that a testator had been unduly influenced
in drafting his will is placed upon the challenger." The quan-
tum of evidence necessary for a successful challenge, however,
is dependent upon which of two tests is utilized by the court.
Under one test, clear and convincing evidence of four factors
is required: susceptibility, opportunity, disposition, and cov-
eted result.4' Under the second theory, a presumption or infer-
ence of undue influence arises if a confidential relationship
between the testator and beneficiary, coupled with "suspicious
circumstances," is established." The notably lower standard of
proof required in the latter test is premised on the ease by
which one in a confidential relationship can influence the
drafting or procuring of a will.43 Arbitrary use of either test has
40. ATKINSON, WILLS § 101 (2d ed. 1953).
41. 67 Wis. 2d 279, 282, 227 N.W.2d 34, 35 (1975); see also, Estate of Von Ruden,
55 Wis. 2d 365, 373, 198 N.W.2d 583 (1972); Will of Freitag, 9 Wis. 2d 315, 101 N.W.2d
108 (1960).
42. 67 Wis. 2d 279, 283, 227 N.W.2d 34, 35 (1975); see also, Will of Faulks, 246 Wis.
319, 17 N.W.2d 423 (1945); Will of Cooper, 28 Wis. 2d 391, 137 N.W.2d 93 (1965).
43. 67 Wis. 2d 279, 227 N.W.2d 34, 42 (1975), quoting Estate of Steffke, 48
Wis. 2d 45, 51, 179 N.W.2d 846, 849 (1970).
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not, however, been a judicial policy in Wisconsin. Thus, when
a confidential relationship is found to exist, the role of the court
is limited to determining whether the circumstances surround-
ing the execution of the challenged will are "suspicious."44
Both the majority and dissenting opinions acknowledged
these two theories of proof. Each also unquestionably asserted
that a confidential relationship existed between the testator
and his attendant. 5 In evaluating the trail court's finding of
facts, however, the majority focused its attention on determin-
ing whether undue influence had been adequately proved
under the fourfold opportunity test.
The majority found that the trial court's findings were not
against the "great weight and clear preponderance of the evi-
dence."46 Two crucial issues, however, emerged from the court's
response: (1) Was the majority applying too stringent a test in
evaluating the facts presented? And (2), since a confidential
relationship had been clearly acknowledged, would the facts at
least have warranted a finding that suspicious circumstances
existed?
The majority did not ignore the applicability of the "suspi-
cious circumstance" approach. The majority addressed the
trial court's use of this theory to evaluate the contestor's chal-
lenge. In direct contrast to the detailed analysis accorded the
fourfold opportunity test, the court was short and conclusory
in reaching its determination that no suspicious circumstances
surrounded the preparation of the will. "[T]he basic question
which must be determined from the evidence submitted is al-
ways whether 'the free agency of the testator has been de-
stroyed.' "' The court held that such a result had not occurred
when the will was executed or at any time.
The court seemed to base this determination on the absence
of what it would consider clearly objectionable actions by the
attendant in either dictating the terms of the will or soliciting
its preparation. The actual provisions of the final draft were
not questioned by the court. Although the challengers had vig-
orously asserted that the escalation of the attendant's share
44. 67 Wis. 2d 279, 299, 227 N.W.2d 34, 42 (1975).
45. Id. at 283 (majority) and 297 (dissent), 227 N.W.2d at 35 (majority) and 42
(dissent).
46. Id. at 289 (majority) and 294 (dissent), 227 N.W.2d at 38 (majority) and 41
(dissent).
47. Id. at 294-95, 227 N.W.2d at 41.
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and elimination of the testator's heirs as residuary legatees
constituted an unnatural revision, the court was not responsive
to the allegation. Rather, the court asserted: "There is no evi-
dence in the record to reflect that Jenkins [nurse] procured
the drafting of the will or participated in its drafting."45 A
finding of suspicous circumstances would seemingly be limited
to evidence of an improper activity in drafting or procuring the
will itself.
Paralleling the specificity with which the majority had ana-
lyzed the facts under the opportunity test, the dissenter evalu-
ated the evidence applying the confidential-suspicious circum-
stance test. The dissent was highly critical of the majority's
primary consideration of the opportunity test when a confiden-
tial relationship had been clearly acknowledged. The trial
court's rejection of the presence of "suspicious circumstances"
was likewise attacked as a "conclusion of law, no more.""
Three considerations were utilized by the dissent to structure
its analysis of the evidence: (1) the unexplained change in the
testator's attitude in substituting the residuary legatees,"0 (2)
the unnatural result (virtual disinheritance) which such substi-
tution produced,5 and (3) the apparent inconsistency of the
change with the stated purpose of the will.52 Suffice it to say
that for each circumstance that the dissent found not only
capable of arousing suspicion, but "completely persuasive of
the fact of undue influence upon the testator,"5 3 the majority
asserted it could "be at least partially explained. '54
While the dissenter's substantive argument is instructive,
the framework of their analysis is more crucial to the hypothes-
ized change of policy arising from Estate of Hamm. The three
considerations were each directed to underscoring the unnatu-
ral result produced by the sequence of wills. What precisely the
attendant had done to influence the testator or when any over-
reaching actually occurred was not the crucial consideration.
The burden of proving "suspicious circumstances" was deemed
met because this unnatural result was not convincingly ex-
48. Id. at 295, 227 N.W.2d at 41.
49. Id. at 300, 227 N.W.2d at 44.
50. Id. at 305, 227 N.W.2d at 46.
51. Id. at 306, 227 N.W.2d at 47.
52. Id. at 308, 227 N.W.2d at 48.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 291, 227 N.W.2d at 39.
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plained by the nurse's activity or surrounding facts. In essence,
the dissenter's analysis appeared to consist of a thorough con-
sideration of the "coveted result" criteria of the opportunity
test. It would seem to appear that while the majority was seek-
ing evidence of the attendant's activity from which overreach-
ing could be inferred, the dissenters focused on the unexplained
result produced from the sequence of will changes to deduce the
presence of undue influence.
One might speculate that this difference in approaches and
conclusions is due to the absence of judicial specificity in defin-
ing what does constitute "suspicious circumstances." General
criteria were suggested in Will of Faulks,55 a case cited by both
the majority and dissent:
[S]uch as the fact that the beneficiary took part in the prep-
aration or procuring of the will, or actually drafted it or as-
sisted in its execution, or that the testator was weak-minded
or in frail health and particularly susceptible to influence, or
that the provisions of the will are unnatural and unjust."0
The Faulk court itself supplemented these factors with the
alternative criteria of either "a sudden and unexplained change
in the attitude of the testator or some other somewhat persu-
asive circumstance. '57
Prior case law has been no more helpful in adding specific-
ity. In Estate of Culver,5" cited by the dissent, the court held
that the transfer of the residue of a $30,000 estate to a late-in-
life companion of the testatrix constituted a "remarkable and
unnatural bequest which raised a red flag of warning."59 In
Estate of Hamm, however, with a $900,000 residuary estate in
issue, the majority did not find the sequence of changes leading
to the bequest unnatural or suspicious. Whether the Wisconsin
Supreme Court will in the future narrow its view of suspicious
circumstances to evidence surrounding the activities of the al-
leged influencer (majority) or focus on the unexplained nature
of the resulting will (dissent) appears far from settled by this
four-three decision.
HELEN M. ZOLNOWSKI
55. 246 Wis. 319, 17 N.W.2d 423 (1945).
56. Id. at 359, 17 N.W.2d at 440.
57. Id. at 360, 17 N.W.2d at 440.
58. 22 Wis. 2d 665, 126 N.W.2d 536 (1964).
59. Id. at 673, 126 N.W.2d at 540.
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